President Wilson, after having spent the month of January and the first two weeks of February in Paris, planned to leave the conference on February fourteenth for America to handle a number of domestic issues and, in particular, to rally support for the peace conference. He intended to have Colonel House take his position on the Supreme Council. Wilson chose House for his supposed insight into other people and his understanding of public opinion. However, Wilson was concerned about House's feeling the need to compromise in certain areas and of his contacts with the press. (3)
As to what might happen while Wilson he away from Paris, the President was aware that certain delegations at the peace conference whose plans clashed with Wilson's were awaiting his departure so they could try to get things done behind his back. This applied, in particular, to the French who were determined to secure their borders. (4) But Wilson was confident that he could always re-correct things after his return from America. (5)
Given recent past history (the Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War, World War I), the French had come to the conclusion that control of the Rhineland was essential for security. The French feared the Germans, who had a larger population than the French and greater economic power, would soon possess the ability in the future to invade France again. As a result the French wanted to redraw the maps of Europe in order to maintain their security, and the general French proposal was to possess the Rhineland. The French also though that the issue of Germany's western borders should be decided immediately while the allies had the advantage over the Germans. Wilson had generally opposed any territorial adjustments in the peace treaty, and Wilson and Lloyd George had both sought to enact a peace that would not be severe on the Germans. Thus, they disapproved of creating an independent (and thus French-controlled) Rhenish republic. (6)
On 10 January Marshall Foch the commander-in-chief of the allies armies, proposed that the Rhine River be the new military frontier of Germany and that the left bank be occupied militarily. In addition, Foch suggested that three of the most important bridgeheads on the East bank of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblentz and Cologne) be occupied and that Rhine territories along the left side of the Rhine river be possessed by the French for thirty years. Further, the territories of Eupen and Malmedy should be annexed to Belgium. The American and British opposed this, even while affirming an understanding of the French desire for security. (7) Given the strong American opposition, the French felt that they could best raise the issue while Wilson was in America and House was in charge. (8)
Before Wilson left, he instructed House that business should proceed on all issues while he was away, including "territorial boundaries." (9) In meetings with Wilson before he departed, House told Wilson that he wished to have an intensive negotiation plan, but would only go as far as on any specific issue to make it possible for Wilson to make the final decision. House then received Wilson's approval to work on four items while Wilson was away: (10)
1. a reduction of the German army and navy to a peacetime footing;
2. a delineation of the boundaries of Germany, this to include the cession of colonies;
3. a decision on the amount of reparation to be paid and the length of time for payment;
4. an agreement as to the economic treatment of Germany.
Wilson wanted to maintain the principle of self-determination for the residents of the Rhine lands and not to be too hard on the Germans in the sanctions imposed. (11) On maintaining these two principles, House did tell Wilson "compromises as to detail might be necessary, though none of principle would be permitted." (12) House continued to say that Wilson "had [made] many [compromises] since he had been here and that I did not wish him to leave expecting the impossible in all things." (13) The President ordered House to keep him informed by cable and also told House to show those cables to no one else. By doing this Wilson hoped to avoid any "trouble" between House and his fellow commissioners. (14)
House, despite the orders that Wilson had given him, had his own beliefs as to what was the proper negotiating course to follow. "If the conditions we impose upon [Germany] are unjust it will simply mean the breeding of another war....Our only chance for peace, I thought was to create a league of nations, treat Germany fairly, and see that she did not have an opportunity to again equip and maintain an army that would be formidable."(15)
Once Wilson had left, House immediately set about getting things done and trying to figure out, as he said later in his journals, how "to wind up quickly the business of the conference regarding boundaries." (16)
One of the first pieces of business was a resolution introduced by Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary. His proposal was for a standard wording to be sent to each of the "enemy states":
The preliminary peace terms, other than the naval, military, and air conditions should cover inter alia the following points:
(a) the approximate future frontiers of _____ [for Germany only: "and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty right s outside Europe]"
(b) the financial conditions to be imposed on _______
(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to ________
(d) the responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
House amended the resolution to include the phrase "inter alia," which he thought would leave room for issues that House did not fell comfortable bringing up at the time. (17) House did this in particular to prevent the exclusion of "the League of Nations Covenant from the preliminary treaty." (18) House also did not want to finalize the border issue, because he wanted to let Wilson himself make the final decision. In the meantime, there were other issues that House felt comfortable working on so he sped up the process of the "expert committees" in order get things done on the treaties. (19)
The first time the issue of Germany's western borders arose was on 19 February during an interview between Foch and the British chief of staff. Foch clearly said that Germany should have no land west of the Rhine. Foch also felt that the allies should press Germany on the terms of peace as soon as possible because the Germans were in a weakened position.(20)
It was after this conversation that House spoke of Wilson to some journalists as "inclined to do things in the most difficult way" and "that proceedings s were going more smoothly in the absence of the president."(21) House's own personal style showed now; instead of working publicly in the committees and public forums, he chose to meet with the other diplomats behind the scene in one on one meetings. (22)
Since Wilson had already left for Boston, House kept Wilson informed that the Balfour resolution had been adopted and that the American territorial "experts" were "in substantial agreement with the British and French in respect to the boundaries of Germany." House informed Wilson that the various committees developing reports for sections of the treaty would be done by Wilson's return. (23)
Wilson responded that "the memorandum...seems to me like an attempt to use the good offices of the French to hurry us into acquiescence in their plans in regard to the western bank of the Rhine" and that he did want the delegates to support this plan. He also thought that it was inappropriate for the issues of the borders of Germany to be decided by the Supreme War Council. He continued to say that "The determination of the geographic boundaries of Germany involves the fortunes and interests of other peoples, and we should not risk being hurried into a solution arrived solely at the French official viewpoint. (24) Wilson believed that the French were taking advantage of his absence and House's willingness to compromise. (25
The French pressed for a Rhine border, and in a meeting between House and Clemenceau on the 22 February, Clemenceau asserted his desire for a an independent Rhenish republic on the west bank if the French could not simply annex the Rhineland (26) The French did agree to stop occupying the left bank of the Rhine if the Germans would accept the peace terms. House expressed concern in his journal that the creation of a Rhenish republic would be against "the principle of self determination. That doing this to the Germans would be unfair because it would be done to no one else. That this could cause the world to fear that the English French and Americans were attempting to dominate the world thus alienating the rest of the world. House said that he told Balfour this and they agreed on this concern but despite that "we both have a profound sympathy for France and for the unhappy situation in which she finds herself." (27)
House, wishing to accomplish something with the French on the issue of western borders, recognized that French public opinion wished to confine Germany to the east bank of the Rhine. Despite the fact that Wilson had told House to confine his work to military and naval issues, House continued to negotiate on the point of the Rhenish republic by calling it a military issue. House reasoned that since the French saw the border issue as military in nature, as such he was not defying Wilson's orders.
House was able to get the French to give some ground and informed Wilson of the French compromises. (28) As House continued negotiating the western borders, the French proposed to House that the Rhenish republic be exempt from reparations, that is, it should be disarmed and that the people should be taken care of and made content so they would want to stay independent. House cabled Wilson with this proposal while knowing that it violated the principle of self-determination that the Americans held so dear. House also reported the proposed French compromise that the Rhenish republic would last only as long as France needed to rebuild its military. (29)
In proceeding to negotiate with the French on establishing Germany's western borders, House disobeyed Wilson's order not to work on the western borders as Wilson said to "withstand such a program immovably" (30), which meant that he should not work on the western borders until Wilson returned. House continued the negotiations based on his belief that this was best time to resolve the borders issue.
On 25 February, André Tardieu, one of Clemenceau's chief advisors, pronounced the French stand on the Rhenish republic was the only way to stop the Germans from beginning trouble. What the French wanted was a fifteen-year allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the important bridgeheads with a three-stage process of withdrawal: the first withdrawal happening at five years if the Germans met the conditions of the peace treaty; the second after ten years if the Germans continue to uphold the treaty; and full withdrawal at the end of the fifteen years. If, at any time, the Germans violated the treaty, the area would be re-occupied. (31) The French also insisted on a fifty kilometer demilitarized zone on the right side of the Rhine. (32) House informed Wilson of the French compromise of only a short occupation at the bridgeheads, which House liked. House also said that he would send more information when he had finished reading the complete details of the compromise. (33)
Wilson did not respond and gave no indication as how to respond and no understanding of the compromise the French made. (34) This happened because Wilson had trouble understanding House's message and did not feel comfortable responding. This caused House to feel that he should continue exploring the issue through negotiations and do what he thought was right. (35)
What happened next was recorded in the diary of Vance McCormick, an advisor of Wilson and chairman of War Trade Board: "At 5:00 Colonel House and Tardieu came for tea also Aubert and Tardieu. They agreed on a plan for the Rhenish Republic." House felt that "we got nearer together on the question of the Rhenish Republic and Luxemburg." (36)
In finalizing these negotiations, Clemenceau proved far more difficult than Tardieu. House cabled Wilson about Clemenceau's truculence, and Wilson responded "am made a little uneasy by what you say on the left bank of the Rhine. I hope you will not even provisionally consent to the separation of the Rhenish Provinces from Germany under any arrangement but will reserve the whole matter until my arrival." (37) But House, before receiving Wilson's response, had given the impression that the French proposal was acceptable to the Americans. And before receiving the President's message, on 10 March he agreed to establish a secret committee to draw up the final boundaries. (38)
The negotiators had to sell this hard fought deal to their respective peoples. A key part in approving the compromises that the French had made was to get Clemenceau to convince the French people to accept the deal. Although the British felt that the armed border should be set east of the Rhine and that no Rhenish republic should be established, Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, felt that it should survive public opinion in Britain and the United States. (39)
When it came to permanently settling the border issues, House felt that the conference should wait until Wilson returned to finalize anything. (40) This surprised Tardieu, who was ready to finalize the agreement. Upon understanding House's reluctance, Tardieu wrote Wilson saying that he wanted to wait until Wilson returned on 17 March 17 to settle anything permanently. (41)
What House had done was to move quickly on resolving the western border issue. While Wilson had initially said that the work on the borders should proceed, he did not want anything settled finally. Wilson agreed with House when House said that things would be prepared for his return and then finalized by Wilson. However later Wilson said explicitly not do anything on the issue of Germany's unless military considerations were involved. House correctly interpreted the border issue, as the French did also, as being primarily a military and strategic point. He proceeded to negotiate on the borders in what he later called "the tradition of good diplomacy." (42)
In the end the Allies resolved the issue of Germany's western border in a manner that violated Wilson's instruction to House not to agree to any separation of the Rhenish Provinces from Germany until his return. Because House had already agreed to establish a committee to draw up the borders, he, in essence, had committed the U.S. to the French compromise. Only too late did House realize that he should do no more until the President's return.
On Wilson's return, House informed Wilson to what he had agreed. Wilson felt House had gone too far on the issue of the western borders, and what caused Wilson to be displeased was that House had become so caught up in the negotiations that he had lost site of Wilson's general policy intentions.