No one has yet accurately tallied the actual number of correspondents who were assigned to report the progress of the Paris Peace Conference. Estimates ranged from no fewer than five hundred special correspondents, "the most able competent writers in every country, representing the most powerful newspapers and the largest circulations," (24) to one thousand journalists, of whom five hundred were Americans. (25)
Those present represented the elite of journalism the world over. (26) The French contingency included journalists from Le Echo de Paris, which was widely read in army circles, Journal des Debats, established in 1789, Le Action Francaise, L'Humanite, Le Figaro, Le Temps, and Le Matin, which claimed two million readers. (27) Newspapers of other nations sent their experts as well. From Italy, there was Dr. Mario Borsa; from Japan, Shunkichi Akimoto. (28) Anti-Japanese reporters were present, too. Stephen Bonsal recorded in his diary that "every broken-down newspaperman from the east coast of Asia is here writing scurrilous articles about the Japanese." (29)
Journalists came to Paris for news, and they interpreted Wilson's promises of "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" as a special guarantee to their profession. They expected to satiate their appetites with conference information. (30) Sometimes they became boisterous, agitated, and even impolite in their determination to fulfill their missions. "They sat at every doorway, they looked over every shoulder, they wanted every resolution and report and wanted it immediately." (31)
In the melee at Paris, journalists occasionally lost their sense of fair play and made accusations which now appear unjustified. American newspapermen resented the French practice of "interpreting" the news for their own reporters, of discussing current conference topics, and deplored the practice of manipulating the news to distort the activities of the American delegation. (32) They revealed they were envious of the French, who skillfully distributed French views to newspapers in the most remote regions of the world. (33)
The French were very adept at distributing news. Shortly after the conference opened, Clemenceau sensed a contentious attitude among the journalists, (34) so he permitted them to meet with his two assistants, Foreign Secretary Stephen Pichon and André Tardieu, an experienced journalist, at regularly scheduled times. (35) The newspapermen assembled at Pichon's office each Sunday morning to gather whatever information he might volunteer or they might extract from him. By opening these conferences to foreign journalists, the French obtained moral support from around the world. (36) Estimates of Pichon's value as a news source vary. Some correspondents considered his statements worthless, deceptive, and evasive, while another discovered that within the confines of a private interview, he "put aside all diplomatic evasion and talked with perfect frankness." (37)
Tardieu received the press on Thursdays. After meeting with them, the journalists left these conferences satisfied because they believed that "He says what he likes, how he likes, and when he likes. But he says it." (38) Naturally, there were reporters who dissented from this opinion, such as the American who uttered that "I attend regular press conferences...Occasionally I went to the French, who were such obvious liars that their perfidy palled after it ceased to be amusing." (39)
For the correspondents to do their jobs successfully, it was necessary to establish relationships with many officials who had the needed information. Reporters were considered to be outsiders; they had no right to sit in the councils, nor to witness the deliberations. (40) Realistic politician that he was, Clemenceau, the former journalist, acted as genial host to the visiting newspaper representatives. At his suggestion, the French government leased the Maison Dufayel, the splendid residence of a Paris department store owner, and converted it into the Foreign Press Club. (41) The accommodations included formal entertainment provided by members of the Opera, the Opera Comique, and lavish banquets. (42) The French government also fitted the building with a library, game rooms, writing facilities, a post office, barber shop and a restaurant where the journalist could eat "without exposing himself to ruin" in inflationary Paris. (43) Telegraphic facilities and telephones conveniently located in the house added to the Maison Dufayel's reputation as "the most luxurious club ever provided for the Press." (44)
Most of the major delegations tried to provide news facilities for the reporters and to arrange for contacts between themselves and the newspapermen. They formalized their relations by assigning representatives to supply information to the journalists at regular times and locations. Reporters referred to these conferences, which they often found uninformative, as "the daily dope." (45)
While journalists covered the work of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Premier Georges Clemenceau, and Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando, (46) primary attention centered on Wilson, author of the Fourteen Points that had "allegedly" served as the basis for the armistice and which many regarded as a blueprint for a new world order. (47)
The President arrived in Paris more than a month before the conference formally opened and held almost daily discussions with European statesmen, largely to convince them of a need for a League of Nations, his favorite subject. (48) Public appearances provided Wilson with repeated personal triumphs, which suggested to some U.S. newspaper reporters that his position was impregnable: "In both England and France President Wilson is the object of adoration. What he says in canonical. No one thinks of disputing his statements." (49) After accompanying the President on trips to London and Rome, reporter Lincoln Steffens described him as "the world leader," "the hope of the race," "the potential ruler of Europe," and added "the statesmen of Europe knew it and feared it." (50) However, not all journalists agreed with this observation. Even before Wilson arrived in France, Alfred Capus editorialized in his conservative Le Figaro that "In a few days, he will be on the continent. I was going to say he would descend to earth." (51)
Accompanying Wilson were four American commissioners, yet only two sat on the highest councils during the summit. (52) Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, ranked officially next to Wilson, but proved critical of the President's strategy and assessments. (53) Lansing stressed that publicity should govern negotiations at the conference. He believed that public opinion should acquire the same power in diplomacy that it exercised within the affairs of democracies because secrecy abased the confidence necessary to maintain peace and friendliness between states. (54)
Although occupying no official post in the U.S. government, Colonel Edward M. House was appointed to the delegation. An ardent supporter and informal advisor of Wilson, House tended to practice diplomacy in practical ways. Before the peace conference opened, House wrote in his diary: "My days recently have been largely taken up in trying to formulate and direct public opinion in England, France, Italy, and the United States." (55)
Both Lansing and House enjoyed a working relationship with several journalists and gave interviews that were probably more informative that the regularly scheduled appearances. Lansing saw reporters when the conference cloaked itself in strict censorship during the months of March through June. His last diary notation indicated a group interview on June 10. (56) The entry suggests that the secretary gave additional favors to the press: "Dave Lawrence on French censorship and general matters"; (57) "Rode for 11/4 hours in Bois with Dick Oulahan"; (58) "Wilson of Intl News Service called." (59)
House documented even more fully his close interaction with members the press. Diary entries for one week in January revealed a conversation with a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, a talk with a reporter of Milan's Il Secolo, and a luncheon with the editor of Le Matin. (60) Early in the conference, House established the practice of meeting with reporters regularly at six in the afternoon. (61) However, he lost some news contacts toward the end of the conference, partly because he no longer sat on the Council of Four, and partially, perhaps, because he had lost favor with Woodrow Wilson. His interviews in that late period contained less information of value and interest to the journalists. (62)
Wilson, on the other hand, chose to keep his distance from the working journalists. He approached the question of open relations between the American Commission and the press by instructing his colleagues to meet reporters briefly every day, and recommended that Ray Stannard Baker, a journalist, be placed in charge of an office to prepare the materials issued by the Commission. (63)
The American delegation did not agree entirely with Wilson; House preferring each member to talk separately with reporters of his own choice, and the other three commissioners choosing to hold joint press conferences to insure agreement on released information. (64) They asked Wilson to provide precise views and opinions and learned that he intended "the conversations between members of the Commission and the newspaper gentlemen...to be confidential." (65)
In the pre-conference days, Joseph Tumulty, Wilson's private secretary in Washington, would wire congratulations to his chief on the manner in which he handled the press, urging him to "keep close to all these boys." (66) During the entire conference, Wilson received reporters only twice (67), yet on those occasions, he talked freely, enthusiastically, and entertainingly. (68)
Any notion of confidentiality with respect to the peace negotiations ran counter to the hopes of journalists who expected more. They interpreted the first of Wilson's Fourteen Points to mean that "there shall be no private international understandings of any kind," and that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." (69) Wilson explained that "It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind." (70) However, in press conferences, Wilson's commissioners talked very little (71) or were hindered by a lack of specific information. Apparently Wilson did not exchange views with his colleagues freely or frequently enough to keep them informed. (72)
As Wilson and his delegation debated over how information was to be provided to members of the press, the selection of French Premier Georges Clemenceau as president of the peace conference had important repercussions for the role of the fourth estate. The former newspaperman and physician was resolute in his concern for his beloved France. Twice he had witnessed Germany inundate his country. These bitter memories, coupled with his estimate of Germany's capacity to recover, drove him relentlessly toward a settlement that would forever secure France against German depredation. (73) Clemenceau's relentless pursuit even governed his war-time censorship policies. Upon assuming the premiership in late 1917, he permitted reporters to "attack me as much as they like," but also demanded "suppression of news dangerous to the interior and exterior security of France." (74)
Clemenceau seldom saw the press in open conference during negotiations. Instead of giving formal statements, the premier talked freely to individual reporters he knew; if, however, the reporter asked the wrong question, Clemenceau waved "his arms about, belligerently and at times despairingly, as much as to say 'you know better than to ask that.'" (75) For clear evidence that he sometimes delivered his opinions without restraint, one has only to see his statement to Wickham Steed of the Daily Mail, to the effect that Wilson fancied himself another Jesus Christ come down to earth to reform mankind. (76)
Given Wilson's disposition toward reporters and Clemenceau's uninhibited conduct with regard to journalists, the relationship of the conference to the press was bound to be divisive. Disputes arose early when the French Premier raised the question of publicity in meeting with Wilson to discuss plans for the peace conference on 12 January. After debating various matters on the agenda, (77) Clemenceau introduced the question of relations with the press with the emphatic statement that since the public generally expected the conference to report "everything occurring in the course of our deliberations, . . .It is of the utmost importance to show the public the results of our labors." (78) He further suggested that if the leaders restricted the press, they would encourage suspicion of themselves and their work: "Would it not be believed that we are concealing something important?" (79) When the British delegation asked for specific recommendations, Clemenceau replied that "in his scheme there would be partial publicity, according as the Allies saw fit." (80)
The council accepted the premier's suggestion of partial publicity, with a secretary recording that "it was agreed that the press should be informed that after a meeting of the Supreme War Council,...The Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries had an exchange of views...for formulating in a preliminary way the terms of peace." (81) Newspapers carried slightly differing versions of the meeting, but the French and British communiques differed very little. (82) Wilson declared these communiques a form of censorship and indicated that the journalists reported only from official bulletins and news they "obtained from the local press." (83) But neither Lloyd George nor Clemenceau wished to leave the press on its honor. The council arrived at no agreement on the management of press relations. (84) There were indications that the press would not be present at the opening plenary session of the conference. (85)
The communique system adopted by the council was announced officially only after it became the subject of rumors that raced through journalistic circles. (86) The New York Times contained the headline "Adopt Secrecy for Peace Conclave, Americans and British Opposing It," and in its lead story, noted that "The whole spirit of the action taken is contrary in every respect to the assurances given to the American people....The fact remains that the resolution must have been supported by the delegates of at least three powers, which shows how little the doctrine of open covenants, openly arrived at, prevails among those who are engaged in settling the destinies of the world." (87) Its editorial page admonished that "What the statesmen seemingly forget is that mystery invites investigation...They [reporters] are there to write about what goes on in those meetings, and certainly they are going to do it unless they are suppressed by censorship of a severity which the world is in no mood to tolerate." (88)
American journalists, upon hearing the news, were bitterly disappointed and indignant, (89) with some reporters protesting immediately to Baker, who "actually turned pale before the onslaught." They threatened to request their own recalls to discredit Wilson, they denounced the action as hypocritical, and they extracted from Baker a promise to talk to Colonel House about the difficulty. (90)
Before the council convened on 16 January, American reporters went to Lansing to receive an official statement concerning secret negotiations. He gave them an interview placing the American delegation on record as favoring the "fullest publicity consistent with the rapid and satisfactory discharge of important business." (91) The secretary thought that necessary limitations on publicity for earlier diplomatic conversations might be removed in the plenary sessions which took final action on peace terms. Lansing told reporters that " no agreement...could be effective until approved by all the delegates in open session"; therein he gave his interpretation of Wilson's first point. (92)
The British correspondents, who had just heard from their foreign office that they were to work unhindered by English or French censorship (93) now learned that the conference planned to limit their freedom. English journalists converged on the Hotel Astoria and wrote a strong memorandum to Lloyd George, who, with other British delegates, they believed, would "speedily convince their Conference colleagues that the time has gone by for this medieval form of 'secret diplomacy.'" (94)
Working unencumbered was not an unusual circumstance for French journalists who did not apply a literal application to the principles of open covenants and were not as concerned over the notion of secret negotiations. The French public had grown accustomed to war-time censorship, and a great many citizens were convinced that open discussions would lead to embarrassing displays of differing policies, which might enable Germany to influence negotiations and "thus endanger the peace as well as postpone its advent." (95) "After all," one Parisian newspaper indicated, diplomatic negotiations were not the same as "discussing the purchase of a cow." (96) Many French reporters were in complete agreement with the view of their government that French national aims depended not so much upon public discussion as upon shrewd diplomacy. (97) However, the Right Wing publication, Le Figaro, challenged the Conference's lack of publicity, editorializing "Are the promoters of this affair keeping it secret?...The public demands that it be informed, yet day after day, you provide no details of incidents or discussions." (98)
Arguably, the very presence of a worldwide press, and the possible influence that the politicians offered, compelled negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference to implement various forms of censorship and influenced their decision to perform much of their debates in confidence. The press covered these events, with some indignation, and the surrounding veil of secrecy ultimately led to policy disasters.
A good example of the discord caused by secret, as opposed to fully publicized diplomacy, and its subsequent effect on the conference and world press, was Wilson's secret diplomacy regarding the Shantung settlement. (99) This one act may have isolated reporters and doomed his later attempt to have the Senate ratify the Treaty. Shantung was a Chinese province that had been taken over by Germany in 1898. During World War I, the Japanese seized it from the Germans, and during the Peace Conference, the question arose about whether the province was to be restored to China or given to Japan. (100) Clearly, the Chinese had a stronger claim to their own land, but in order to enlist Japan's help against Germany during the war, "the governments of Britain, France, and Italy had secretly promised to give Shantung to Japan." (101) Wilson, who had explicitly rejected such secret treaties and territorial deals in his Fourteen Points, could have voiced his objection to the secret pact, but the Japanese and French used Wilson's desire for a league of nations as leverage. (102)
Charles Thompson chronicled that during final negotiations over Shantung, the President ruled that unanimity was "necessary" on the Japanese amendment. (103) Lansing was more forthright and indicated that the controversy between Japan and China over who should possess property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula was not decided "until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germany was completed." (104) The decision, favorable to Japanese claims, resulted from "a species of 'blackmail' not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possible because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the conversations concerning Shantung were secret." (105)
The Shantung decision turned into a public policy disaster for Wilson as journalists seized the opportunity to attack the covert deliberations. Wilson's team of negotiators disapproved of his decision, and that information was leaked to waiting journalists who wired from Paris that "Some officials connected with the American Peace Mission are greatly displeased [with the Shantung settlement], holding that the transfer was not in accordance with the principles under which peace is being made." (106) The Chinese delegation called Wilson's decision a "trick" and pleaded for justification. "If there is a reason for the Council to stand firm on the question of Fiume," the Chinese asked, why would Shantung, "which includes the future welfare of 36,000,000 souls" not also receive the same consideration? (107)
As the weeks progressed, so too did the journalistic assaults on Wilson's Shantung settlement. The Associated Press reported "While waiting in suspense, the delegation has learned with surprise that clauses to be inserted in the peace treaty relating to Shantung go further that ever suspected." (108) Commentaries from Tokyo indicated a growing agitation spreading to virtually all-leading newspapers within the Empire. An anti-American campaign in the Japanese press included bitterness toward President Wilson, describing him as a "'Hypocrite,' 'Despot,' 'Transformed Kaiser,' 'Man with the voice of an angel but with deeds of the devil,'" and the American journalists printed it all. (109) Ironically, two days later, Charles Grasty cabled a special report to the New York Times hailing the "persistent attitude" of President Wilson for allowing members of the press to provide full coverage of the delivery of peace terms to the German delegates at Versailles, over the objections of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. (110)
Privately, Tasker H. Bliss, one of four American Commissioners who accompanied Wilson to Paris, would write, "I have never seen a glaring case of secret diplomacy, not withstanding all our protestations. The outrageous yielding to Japan on the Shantung question could never have happened if it had not been done secretly." (111)
Public opinion in the United States mirrored Bliss's condemnation of the Shantung agreement. It was considered an aspersion toward a nation weak from political discord, in favor of a nation with a strong military establishment. This had much to do with increasing hostility toward the Treaty (112) and undermined Wilson's attempt for ratification on the Senate floor.